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Abstract  
This paper investigates the effects of revenue diversification on the financial performance of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). The long-standing question about whether financial institutions 
should diversify or focus is a topic of ongoing debate. Using a global sample of MFIs, we 
investigate which view is appropriate for microfinance institutions. The results show that, 
diversification across revenue streams improves sustainability and profitability of MFIs. This 
suggests that revenue diversification is an important strategy for the sustainability of microfinance. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the effects of revenue diversification on the financial performance of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). The paper is motivated by increasing trends of interest rates 
ceilings for MFIs.  As of 2004, about 40 countries introduced interest rates ceilings to protect poor 
borrowers from high interest rates charged by micro-lenders (Helms and Reille 2004). In 2016, the 
Kenyan government for example, also established interest rate ceiling (The Economist, September 
8, 2016) and on March 13, 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia announced interest rate ceiling 
for all MFIs in the country (Sokunthea 2017).  
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 One effect of interest rate ceiling in the microfinance industry is reduced transparency 
concerning cost of loans. “MFIs influenced by interest rate ceilings have tried to cover their costs 
by imposing new charges and fees” (Helms and Reille 2004, 6). The new charges and fees are 
indirect costs of loans but less transparency makes the borrower unware of these costs. Moreover, 
the imposition of interest rates ceilings laws may force MFIs to find alternative sources of income 
to cover their huge operational costs. Interest rates are higher in microfinance than mainstream 
banking because of the high operational costs associated with smaller loans (Helms and Reille 
2004, Fernando 2006, Mersland and Strøm 2013). Thus, revenue diversification in microfinance 
could possibly be as result of interest rates ceilings. In the global sample applied in this study, MFIs 
get income from non-interest sources including investment income, fees and commissions.  
However, as far as their sustainability is concerned, should MFIs diversify their revenue sources?  
 The question about whether financial institutions such as banks should diversify or focus is yet 
to receive a clear-cut answer. Empirical findings seem to support either view. For instance, 
Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) and Berger et al. (2010)  find that diversification does not 
improve bank performance while Chiorazzo, Milani, and Salvini (2008), Cotugno and Stefanelli 
(2012) and Chen and Lai (2017) on the contrary document evidence to support diversification, it 
improves bank performance. Besides the mixed findings, common in the banking industry, there 
seems to be few empirical insights from the microfinance industry.  
Microfinance is a poverty reduction tool with the primary aim of financial inclusion where poor 
people excluded from mainstream banking are provided with financial services (Armendáriz and 
Morduch 2010). Since the 1970s when the concept took its inception, many observers worldwide 
have praised microfinance for the achievement  of its primary goal (Balkenhol and Hudon 2011, 
Biosca, Lenton, and Mosley 2014, Convergences 2017).  Beside financial inclusion, microfinance 
also aims at being a financially sustainable concept, thus, it pursues a double bottom line which 
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Morduch (1999) describes as a “win-win” solution. Thus, MFIs are hybrid organizations pursuing 
both social and financial objectives. Like other social organizations, MFIs seek to enhance the 
welfare of the clients and like banks, MFIs aim to be profitable or at least break-even.  
The microfinance industry is growing very fast, yet few scholars seem to pay attention to it 
concerning the diversification versus focus issue. For example, in 2016, MFIs provided microcredit 
to 132 million borrowers around the globe with USD 102 billion of loan portfolio (Convergences 
2017). The annual growth rates in number of credit clients and loan portfolio between 2015 and 
2016 are 9.6 and 9.4 percent respectively. Previous growth trends can be found in sources reporting 
on the state of microfinance  including Microfinance Baraometer (Convergences 2017) and 
Microcredit Summit Campaign (Reed 2015). Additionally, evidence from the banking industry 
may not be applicable to the microfinance industry since MFIs are hybrid organizations. 
Commercial banks on the other hand are purely profit- oriented firms. Moreover, since there are 
real world cases to support both diversification and focus [see Winton (1999)], it makes sense to 
investigate which view is appropriate for micro-banks (MFIs) . Accordingly, this paper investigates 
the case of MFIs by answering the questions: should microfinance institutions diversify or focus? 
Is diversification helpful in attaining their financial objective? To answer these questions, the paper 
employs a unique global data set.  
Scope studies in banking are often criticized since they are from a single country only [e.g. 
Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006); Berger et al. (2010); Jouida, Bouzgarrou, and Hellara 
(2017)] or region [e.g. Bandelj (2016); Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007); Smith, Staikouras, 
and Wood (2003)], exceptions include Laeven and Levine (2007). This is a disadvantage we 
overcome with our global panel data set of 607 MFIs in 87 countries spanning 1998 -2015. This 
sample at least provides us with some international evidence on the diversification versus focus 
issue from the microfinance industry. 
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Finally, this paper is distinguished by its methodological approach from existing studies that 
conducted pure cross-sectional analysis. It uses panel data to investigate a “within” analysis and 
quantify the effects of variations in diversification for an MFI. The main advantage of this approach 
is that, it controls for important omitted variables such as MFI-specific and regional effects 
(Wooldridge 2011). 
This paper could be relevant for policymakers who regulate the activities of MFIs.  Like banks, 
the diversification versus focus issue is vital for MFIs as some of them are being regulated by 
banking authorities. Banking regulations may tend to incentivize banks or regulated MFIs to 
diversify or focus (Acharya et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2010, Hayden et al., 2007). Moreover, some 
MFIs collect deposits, making them delegated monitors on behalf of depositors (Diamond 1984). 
Effective monitoring of MFI’s activities will depend on the degree of its diversification. The more 
diversified an MFI is, the more complex it becomes (Winton 1999) and this makes monitoring 
ineffective (Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders 2006, Hayden, Porath, and Westernhagen 2007). Thus,  
policymakers may find this paper relevant as to whether or not  financial institutions benefit from 
diversification (Bandelj 2016). In this regard, it is important to investigate empirically the case of 
MFIs. 
The results suggest that, diversification is helpful for the achievement of MFIs’ financial 
objective. Specifically, revenue diversification improves sustainability and profitability of MFIs. 
The paper therefore makes an important contribution to the microfinance sustainability literature. 
The paper is among the first to provide empirical insights on the impact of diversification on the 
financial performance of MFIs. The findings imply that one way MFIs can be sustainable is to 
diversify into non-interest revenue streams. The revenue diversification premium could be 
attributed to the modern portfolio theory, which asserts that holding many imperfectly correlated 
investments results in net positive outcomes (Markowitz 1952). 
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The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on diversification. In Section 3, information on data and estimation approach is provided. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results on the impact of revenue diversification on 
the financial performance of MFIs. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical literature on diversification 
Theoretically, firms diversify for a number of reasons including: risk management, efficiency, 
market power, resource exploitation, and managerial entrenchment (Chiorazzo, Milani, and Salvini 
2008, Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhauser 2010, Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson 2008, Klein and 
Saidenberg 1998). Portfolios theory, developed by Markowitz (1952), suggests that diversification 
leads to risk reduction and improved firm’s value as long as assets returns are imperfectly 
correlated. For instance, expanding geographically requires “dissimilar” economies where 
correlations of returns of new and existing assets are low (Goetz, Laeven, and Levine 2014). Thus, 
diversification reduces total risk resulting in improved financial performance, as idiosyncratic risk 
is minimal if not eliminated in a well-diversified firm.  
Diversification leads to increased operational efficiency through economies of scope as fixed 
costs are spread among a wide range of products and regions (Drucker and Puri 2009) and through 
joint production of financial services (Klein and Saidenberg 1998). Operational efficiency is 
particularly important for microfinance institutions as far as their sustainability is concerned. Given 
that MFIs are struggling with huge operational costs (Mersland and Strøm 2013), gaining 
operational efficiency through diversification could be a step in the right direction.  Like banks, 
MFIs often enter into a long-term relationship with their customers allowing them to reuse 
previously gathered customer information without additional costs (Elsas, Hackethal, and 
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Holzhauser 2010). MFIs may also diversify to increase their market power if market competition 
intensifies (Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson 2008, Winton 1999) and to exploit resources in new 
markets (Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson 2008) or leverage managerial expertise among products 
and regions (Iskandar-Datta and McLaughlin 2007). Agency theory suggests that managers 
diversify their firms for private benefits including empire building or managerial entrenchment 
(Klein and Saidenberg 1998, Campa and Kedia 2002, Jensen 1986). 
 
2.2 Empirical literature on diversification and financial performance 
There is a growing body of empirical literature on the issue of diversification versus focus and 
performance of financial institutions. The findings are mixed and tend to follow two main streams 
of empirical research namely diversification premium and diversification discount. Proponents of 
diversifications suggest that banks can enhance profitability by diversifying across a wide range of 
business lines and regions. For instance, Deng and Elyasiani (2008) find that geographic 
diversification is positively correlated with bank’s value. Similarly, Klein and Saidenberg (1998) 
find that geographic diversification is beneficial to banks. Efficiency opportunities associated with 
internal capital allocation can be exploited by expanding geographically. Campa and Kedia (2002) 
also document evidence that counteracts diversification discount and conclude that diversification 
is a value-creating strategy. Other authors find that revenue diversification improves bank’s 
profitability, in terms of both unadjusted and adjusted returns on assets and equity [e.g., Chiorazzo, 
Milani, and Salvini (2008); Sanya and Wolfe (2010); Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhauser (2010); 
Cotugno and Stefanelli (2012), Sissy, Amidu, and Abor (2017) ] and these findings are robust 
during market instability (Cotugno and Stefanelli 2012) and even the sub-prime crisis (Elsas, 
Hackethal, and Holzhauser 2010).  
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In addition, Lamont and Polk (2001) argue that diversification discount must be investigated, 
taking into consideration both future cash flows and assets returns. They find that diversified firms 
with low value tend to have large future returns compared with diversified firms with high value. 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) also argue that diversification is not a value-destroying 
strategy, it depends on the financial health of the target firm prior to acquisition. Their findings 
suggest that, acquiring an already discounted firm will reduce the value of the acquirer, hence, 
diversification per se does not destroy firm’s value. 
Following the discussion on diversification premium evident in banking, we hypothesize that 
revenue diversification among microfinance institutions could lead to improved financial 
performance. This could be as a result of benefits associated with reduced risk based on portfolio 
theory and operational efficiency through economies of scale. Therefore, the first hypothesis to test 
in this study is as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between revenue diversification and financial 
performance of microfinance institutions. 
On the other hand, opponents of diversification say it is a value-destroying strategy as existing 
management expertise gets diluted and agency costs increase. Other previous studies including 
Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006), Hayden, Porath, and Westernhagen (2007) and Jouida, 
Bouzgarrou, and Hellara (2017) find that diversification is inversely related to bank’s performance. 
Similarly, the findings of Berger et al (2010) suggest that MFIs should focus instead of 
diversifying. More focused banks tend to be cost-efficient resulting in higher profitability. Stiroh 
(2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that income diversification does not improve financial 
institutions’ net operating income as non-interest income tends to be highly volatile. These results 
are consistent to those of Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson (2008) who additionally report that 
income diversification is beneficial to only larger credit unions. 
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Furthermore, Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversification decreases firm’s value and this 
is as a result of overinvestment or wasteful spending, and subsidization of segments with poor 
performance. Laeven and Levine (2007) report that banks’ diversification through financial 
conglomerates is associated with lower market value. They argue that increased agency costs tend 
to offset gains from economies of scope.  
Like banks, we also believe that diversification discount could be present among diversified 
MFIs too because of monitoring difficulties and operational inefficiencies. Having many financial 
activities could make MFIs wore off if competent management team is not put in place. Thus, for 
management control purposes, it may be financially sustaining for MFIs to focus than to diversify. 
To this end, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between revenue diversification and financial 
performance of microfinance institutions. 
 Based on conflicting predictions from theory (portfolio theory versus agency theory), it may 
come as no surprise that empirical findings on the relation between diversification and financial 
performance are mixed. Overall, the studies from traditional banking do not offer an unambiguous 
expectation for the microfinance industry, and we therefore propose two alternative hypotheses. 
Conflicting prior research from other settings suggest that the effect of diversification is context 
dependent and it is an empirical question whether revenue diversification has a positive or 
negative relationship with financial performance in microfinance. Due to the ambiguity, all 
empirical tests will be two-sided.  
 




Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 607 microfinance institutions observed over 18 years period 
(1998-2015). It is a global sample of MFIs from 87 countries (Table A1 in Appendix) covering six 
regions: East Asia and Pacific (56 MFIs), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (105 MFIs), Latin 
America and Caribbean (199 MFIs), Sub-Saharan Africa (176 MFIs), South Asia (46 MFIs), and 
Middle East and North Africa (25 MFIs). The data are collected from former ratingfund and rating 
initiative webpages as well as directly from the rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet 
Rating, Crisil and M-Cril). All of the five rating agencies have been approved and supported by 
the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP), a microfinance branch of 
World Bank. Each of the rating reports contains data for the rating year and the previous years. At 
least, data are available for each MFI up to 18 years for the period 1998-2015. It is worth noting 
that, there is no perfect data set to accurately represent the microfinance industry (Strøm, 
D’Espallier, and Mersland 2016). Accordingly, the data set used for this paper does not cover all 
the small savings and credit cooperatives worldwide but majority of our MFIs are small in size.  
In the microfinance industry, rating data are one of the sources of the most reliable and 
representative available data (Mersland and Strøm 2009). Rating MFIs, with support from donors 
such the Interamerican Development Bank and the European Union, is one of the main ways of 
achieving transparency in the industry (Beisland, Mersland, and Randøy 2014). The rating reports 
provided by the five agencies are much wider in scope of information compared to traditional credit 
ratings (Beisland and Mersland 2012). They cover a wide range of information including financial, 
outreach, ownership, regulation, governance, clients, financial products among others. Rating 
assessment is done in order to produce independent information for stakeholders’ decision making 
purposes (Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland 2016). The sample for this study is an updated version 
of the data set used in Lensink et al. (forthcoming), Pascal, Mersland, and Mori (2017), Randøy, 







3.2 Measures of diversification and financial performance 
Diversification measure 
There are three dimensions of diversification: across financial products and services, geographic 
expansion, and a combination of these two (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe 2007). This paper is 
concerned with the first dimension. Specifically, this study investigates the effects of revenue 
diversification on the financial performance of MFIs. As mentioned earlier, the motivation for 
investigating revenue diversification in this study is because of the increasing trends of interest 
rates ceilings many MFIs face worldwide. Currently, over 40 countries have established interest 
rates ceilings to protect the poor borrowers from high interest rates charged by microlenders (cf. 
Helms and Reille, 2004; Mbengue, 2013). The interest rates ceilings suggests that MFIs may have 
to find alternative revenue-generating activities to cover their operational costs in order to stay in 
business. Hence, we investigate the influence of revenue diversification on MFIs’ financial 
performance.  
We follow other scholars [e.g., Jouida (2017); Stiroh and Rumble (2006); Stiroh (2004); 
Morgan and Samolyk (2003)] to construct Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for revenue 
diversification for each MFI. The measure of revenue diversification (DIV) takes into consideration 
various sources of net operating revenue, which are broadly grouped into two categories: interest 
and non-interest. Interest represents net interest income from loan portfolio while non-interest 
represents all non-interest income including investment income, fees and services charges, among 
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others. Based on this breakdown, we construct our revenue diversification measure for MFIs as 
follows. 




+																																																																(1)                                                                                                       
Where NetOp = net operating revenue and it is the sum of interest and non-interest revenue. DIV 
measures the level of diversification of an MFI’s net operating revenue. Increase in DIV means 
that an MFI becomes more diversified as far as revenue sources are concerned and a figure close 
to zero indicates that all operating revenue nearly comes from one source, thus, an MFI is more 
focused.  
 For robustness checks, we alternatively measure revenue diversification in terms of the share of 
non-interest income (share-non) defined as non-interest income as a proportion of total net 
operating revenue. Increase in Share-non also indicates that an MFI is diversifying into non-interest 
revenue generating activities. Thus, institution is becoming more diversified.  
 
Financial performance measures 
As mentioned earlier, this paper investigates whether diversification is helpful in realizing the 
financial objective of microfinance. Like banks, MFIs should be able to generate profit or at least 
break-even.  Thus, this paper focuses on the sustainability and profitability of MFIs. We  use two 
indicators for each financial dimension. That is, we use OSS and FSS as sustainability indicators 
and ROA and ROE as profitability measures. OSS is operational self-sustainability, a ratio that 
demonstrates the ability of MFIs to be fully sustainable in the long-run, in the sense that they can 
cover all their operating costs and maintain the value of their capital. The operational self-
sustainability ratio is a better measure of financial performance than standard financial ratios, such 
as return on assets or equity, because it entails a more complete list of inputs and outputs. FSS is 
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financial self-sustainability (explained below). ROA (return on assets) and ROE (returns on equity) 
are traditional measures for financial performance, in different fields, not only in microfinance. 
Overall, OSS, FSS, ROA and ROE have been widely used to measure the financial performance 
of MFIs (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007, 2011, Mersland and Strøm 2009, Armendáriz 
and Morduch 2010, Adusei, Akomea, and Poku 2017, Dorfleitner, Priberny, and Röhe 2017, 
Abdullah and Quayes 2016). 
ROA is a ratio of net operating income of the MFI divided by average assets. This ratio allows 
a comparison of an MFI’s performance to those of other MFIs or to the industry benchmark. OSS 




;<=5=	<7	(>:7?678 + @<47	@<==	13<96=6<7 + <123456<7=)																														(2) 
Where operating revenue consists of interest and non-interest income. Funding cost is the cost 
of borrowings (interest and fees on loans and bonds), loan loss provision is the amount set aside to 
cover costs of loans default, and operations refer to cost of operations and include staff and non-
staff costs. If OSS is 1 or 100 percent means full operational self-sufficiency. A value less than 1 
means that the MFI needs to rely on external funding to meet operational costs while a value greater 
1 indicates the MFI can do without subsidies; it is “self-sufficient.” 
Note that the computations of both operating revenue and operating costs include subsidies 
enjoyed by some MFIs, hence, they are not intrinsic or market values. FSS deals with subsidies 
from “soft” loans and investments, calculated as: 
B00 =
/12345678	32927:2
C?D:=52?	E<=5=	<7	(>:7?678 + @<47	@<==	13<96=6<7 + <123456<7=)					(3) 
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FSS adjusts operating revenue and costs to reflect how sustainable an MFI is if its operations 
were unsubsidized and its borrowings were at arm’s length transactions. It is important to make 
subsidy adjustments since MFIs are heterogeneous in terms of the amount of subsidy received. 
These adjustments allow better comparison among MFIs. Additionally, subsidy adjustments allow 
us to get an object picture of the true financial sustainability of an MFI since they operate on 
commercial basis. Overall, FSS seeks to answer the question: can an MFI continue to operate in 
the near future without subsidy?  
There are three types of subsidy adjustments: concessionary borrowings, in-kind donations, and 
cash donations (Mersland and Strøm 2014, Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). The first concerns 
adjustment to funding costs and it takes into account the difference subsidized funding costs and 
unsubsidized funding costs. This difference is added back to funding costs. The second adjustment 
captures donations in-kind or where raw materials were donated or supplied below market cost. 
Cash donations adjustment also capture monies given to the institution at no cost. This should be 
deducted from operating revenue.  
 
Control variables 
MFI size. As in other empirical studies [e.g., Mersland and Strøm (2009); Sanya and Wolfe (2010)] 
we take the natural log of total assets to control for MFI size since there are scale economies in 
microfinance (Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland 2013). It is possible that diversification benefits 
could be related to large size since larger firms are able to diversify better than smaller ones 
(Demsetz and Strahan 1997, Gulamhussen, Pinheiro, and Pozzolo 2014).  
Capital/Asset. This ratio measures the ability of the institutions to withstand shocks. Institution’s 
probability of failure depends on its level of capitalization, larger capitals are safer (Lehar 2005). 
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Loan/Asset. This ratio, gross loan portfolio to total assets, measures differences in MFIs loan 
portfolios. Financial institutions with larger loan assets may focus more on interest activities 
compared with non-interest activities as far as income diversification is concerned (Stiroh and 
Rumble 2006). Moreover, high switching costs in lending relationships tends to stabilize interest 
income (DeYoung and Roland 2001). 
MFI experience. Age controls for differences in experience across MFIs. Learning curve theory 
suggests that the older you are, the better experienced you become. Thus, well-established MFIs 
are more likely to perform better than less experienced MFIs as they already have established 
relationships with customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. MFI age has been used as a control 
variable in other empirical studies [e.g., Pascal, Mersland, and Mori (2017); Hermes, Lensink, and 
Meesters (2011)] 
Portfolio at risk (PaR30). PaR30 is the proportion of gross loan portfolio that is in arrears over 
days. This is a widely used measure of portfolio quality in microfinance as most loans are short-
term in nature. Other empirical studies have used this measure as control variable [e.g. Mersland 
and Strøm (2009); D'Espallier, Guerin, and Mersland (2011)].   
 Regulation. Some MFIs in our sample are regulated by banking authorities. Regulated MFIs 
stand the chance of gaining greater reputation leading to high customer loyalty. The bottom line is 
improved performance (Mersland and Strøm 2009). However, costs of regulation such as security 
requirement cost may reduce the amount of resources available for innovations. Accordingly, costs 
associated with regulation may offset the benefits (Hardy, Holden, and Prokopenko 2003). In sum, 
regulatory policies concerning activity restrictions, diversification requirements, and institutional 




 Geographical area. We also control for the geographical areas within which the MFIs operate. 
In our sample, some MFIs serve only urban clients and others focus on only rural clients. In the 
analysis, the latter category is left out for reasons of singularity. 
 Lending methodology. MFIs adopt three different lending methodologies when it comes to the 
supply of microcredit namely solidarity group, individual and village banking. Solidarity group 
lending is an important innovation of microfinance regarding the repayment of credits (Hulme and 
Mosley 1996, Morduch 1999). It enhances the repayment rates due to peer pressure from other 
group members (Ledgerwood 1999). In the empirical analysis, the first two dummies are included 
while village banking serves as the reference category. 
 Finally, the paper controls for other country specific characteristics including GDP (gross 
domestic product) per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (constant 2011 international $) 
and annual GDP growth rate, following Sanya and Wolfe (2010) approach. Additionally, we 
control for inflation – consumer price index. Table 1 summarizes the variables defined above. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.3 Estimation approach 
This paper employs fixed effects model to account for any important variables omitted 
(Wooldridge 2011). In particular, the paper takes into account any unobserved firm-specific effects 
across MFIs. Our basic regression model is expressed as follows. 
G,# = H- + H.!"#,# + IJ,# + ;, + :,#																																																																																									(4) 
Where G,# is a vector of dependent variables, DIV is the diversification index for revenue, H- is the 
mean of unobserved heterogeneity, β1 and ℽ are coefficients, J,# constitutes the controls for size, 
experience, loan quality, level of capital, loan to asset ratio, location of market, lending method, 
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GDP per person, and GDP growth rate. ;, is firm-specific unobserved effect and :,# is the 
remaining error term that varies across both t and i. The main advantage of using fixed effects 
estimator is that, it wipes out all of the firm-specific unobserved effects (Ci’s). 
To determine whether our estimation method is appropriate for the data, we first check whether 
panel techniques are more appropriate than ordinary least squares (OLS) by applying the Breusch-
Pagan  test (Greene 2003). If the test rejects the null hypothesis, then the random effects model 
(RE) is preferable. The results (Table A2 in Appendix) show that RE model is appropriate. Second, 
we test the assumed correlation between MFI-specific effects and regressors using Hausman’s 
(1978) specification test. A rejection of the null hypothesis in the specification test shows that MFI-
specific effects correlate with regressors, such that a fixed effects model is preferable, which is the 
case in this study (see Table A2). Only in two models (using ROA as dependent) out of eight 
models, the RE estimator is desirable.  However, to be consistent, we use the fixed effects (FE) 
estimator for all models. Moreover, when we compare the results of the two models (involving 
ROA) between FE and RE1 and see that they are not substantially different from each other.  
 
4. Results and discussion  
4.1 Descriptive statistics, correlations and variance inflation factor scores 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimations. DIV has a mean 
value of 0.13 indicating relatively small degree of diversification across non-interest revenue 
sources. On average, about eight percent of MFI’s total revenue is from non-interest sources such 
as commissions and fees (Share-non). Concerning the dependent variables, ROA has a mean value 
of 2.60 percent and that of ROE is 8.20 percent. These profitability means are quite low, suggesting 
 
1 The random effects results are not reported but are available upon request. 
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that MFIs are not purely profit oriented firms. What is important for them is self-sustainability, 
which is the case in this sample as OSS is above one (1.104), indicating that MFIs can cover their 
operational costs from revenue earned. However, the mean value of FSS less than one (0.952) 
suggests that MFIs cannot survive in the long-run without subsidies from governments and other 
advocates of financial inclusion.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Regarding the control variables, on average, an MFI has eleven years of experience with thirty-
seven percent of total assets funded by equity. The average portfolio at risk (Par30) is five percent. 
A large proportion (seventy-five percent) of total assets are loans. This makes sense, since 
microfinance mission is to supply financial services to poor families and microenterprises. In terms 
of geographical focus, twenty-seven percent of MFIs in the sample serve urban clients and with 
respect to their lending methodologies, about twenty-six percent of MFIs offer solidarity group 
loans while fifty-seven percent offer individual loans. 
Furthermore, on average, gross domestic product (GDP) experiences an annual growth rate of 
about five percent over the eighteen-year period. Similarly, inflation has a mean of about six 
percent.  Finally, about thirty-six percent of MFIs are regulated by banking authorities.  
 Table 3 presents pairwise correlations and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores among the 
regressors, which provide information concerning multicollinearity problem. Many correlations 
are significant at one percent level of significance. The correlations do not indicate severity of 
multicollinearity problem because all of them (except the one between DIV and Share-non) are 
less than suggested threshold of 0.70 (Kennedy 2008). The correlation between DIV and Share-
non is quite high (0.96) because they mean the same thing in different measurements. Therefore, 
we do not include both in a model. An alternative and a common approach to detect severity of 
multicollinearity between explanatory variables is the use of VIF score (Studenmund 2011). The 
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rule of thumb is to have VIF values lower than five (Studenmund 2011) or ten (Gujarati 2011, Hair 
et al. 2010) in order to conclude absence of severe multicollinearity problem. Accordingly, our test 
for VIF indicates that all values are less than five, the highest is 2.02 (individual lending). This 
suggests that multicollinearity problem is not severe in this study. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Fixed effects regression results 
 To estimate equation (4), we employ the specific-to-general model-building approach as follows 
(Koopmans 1937, Brooks 2008). For each dependent variable, we run four models. In the first 
model, the dependent variable is regressed on only the diversification variable (DIV). Then in the 
second model, we add only MFI-specific controls while the third model adds macroeconomic 
indicators. In the fourth model, industry regulation control is included. The reason for this 
systematic approach is to detect any sensitivity issues and to establish some level of robustness of 
the results. Finally, for comparison and convenience purposes, we then report all the dependent 
variables in one table (Table A2 in the Appendix). 
 Table 4 presents the regression results of the link between revenue diversification and 
sustainability of MFIs. In models (1) to (4), the dependent variables is operational self-
sustainability while models (5) to (8) relate to financial self-sustainability. Thus, both variables are 
sustainability measures. As expected, the R-squared improves with respect to the systematic 
approach from 0.10 percent in model (5) to 28.80 percent in model (8). The coefficient of DIV is 
positive in seven out of eight models indicating that revenue diversification comes with improved 
sustainability. This suggests that MFIs could be more sustainable by having several non-interest 
revenue generating activities. The finding (DIV) is however not significant in seven models.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
19 
 
Concerning the control variables, the coefficient of MFI size is positive and significant in all 
models, confirming scale economies in microfinance (Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland 2013). We 
also observe that MFI experience reduces operational self-sustainability. This is in contrast to 
learning curve theory. Probably, younger MFIs leapfrog older ones in terms of current efficiency 
practices, which older MFIs may have to learn by trial and error means (Hermes, Lensink, and 
Meesters 2011). As expected, portfolio at risk has negative impact on sustainability and it is 
significant in all models. Increase in non-performing loans requires more efforts in monitoring, 
leading to increased operational costs associated with monitoring (Berger & DeYoung, 1997).  
 Furthermore, equity and loan portfolio as proportions of total assets have significant positive 
effects on sustainability. As expected, group lending improves operational sustainability. However, 
it reduces financial sustainability. It is also observed that, serving urban clients increases MFIs’ 
sustainability, perhaps, costs of doing business with them are lower compared to rural clients. As 
expected, both GDP indicators are significant, suggesting that a healthy economy increases the 
sustainability of MFIs. However, increase in inflation reduces MFIs’ sustainability. Finally, 
regulation is found to have a negative impact on sustainability. This finding concurs with the 
argument that costs of regulations may outweigh its benefits (Hardy, Holden, and Prokopenko 
2003).  
Table 5 reports the FE regression results on the effects of revenue diversification on financial 
performance in terms of profitability (ROA and ROE). This time, DIV is significant in four models 
with control variables included. This suggests that MFIs’ profitability could be improved if they 
have many other sources of revenue aside interest revenue. With respect to the control variables, 
the findings are not significantly different from those in Table 4.  




  For robustness checks, we replace DIV with the ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue 
(Share-non) as the independent variable and repeat all the regressions discussed above. The results 
are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Share-non is highly significant with the same positive coefficients 
in majority of the models. Thus, the additional results provide strong evidence that revenue 
diversification increases the financial performance of microfinance institutions.  
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
 Finally, for easy comparison of the results with the different dependent variables used, Table 
A2 presents a summary. The table contains only models with all the controls. Overall, revenue 
diversification (DIV/Share-non) has a significant positive relationship with performance indicators 
supporting hypothesis 1. This suggests that MFIs may at least break-even when they have multiple 
revenue sources apart from interest revenue. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The academic literature presents two conflicting theories about the extent to which financial 
institutions could expand their operations. Modern portfolio and banking theories suggest 
diversification premium while agency theory argues that it is value destroying for a firm to 
diversify. Thus, it is better to focus in order to reduce agency costs. However, since there is 
empirical evidence supporting each view, the question this study asks is, which view is appropriate 
for microfinance institutions? 
Thus, this paper investigates the effects of revenue diversification on the financial performance 
of MFIs. Using fixed effects estimator, we find evidence that diversification premium exists for 
microfinance institutions. Precisely, diversification across revenue streams improves both 
sustainability and profitability of MFIs.  
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The findings imply that microfinance practitioners could expand and sustain their revenue 
generating activities in order to take advantage of diversification benefits. Once an institution is 
self-sustainable, it is in a better position to meet its core objective of financial inclusion since more 
resources could be amassed to effectively serve poor people.  
A limitation for this paper is that, since the data is based on rating reports, there can be self-
selection bias as MFIs that chose to be rated are those included in the sample. In order to access 
external funding, MFIs may choose to be rated and in the process, they might massage some 
information just be included in the rating assessment. Thus, self-section could be correlated with 
the decision to diversify or focus. Therefore, it would be interesting to replicate this study with 
international evidence from unrated MFIs or a mixed of rated and unrated MFIs.  
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Table 1: Variables definitions  
Variable Definition  
Diversification      
DIV Revenue diversification index, defined in equation (1) 
Share-non Non-interest revenue as a proportion of total revenue 
Financial performance      
Returns on assets (ROA)  Net operating income divided by average assets 
Returns on equity (ROE) Net income divided by equity 
OSS Operational self-sustainability, defined in equation (2) 
FSS Financial self-sustainability, defined in equation (3) 
Control variables      
MFI size Natural logarithm of total assets 
MFI experience The number years an institution is in operation  
Portfolio at Risk (PaR30) Proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days.  
Equity to asset ratio Total equity over total assets  
Loan to asset ratio Gross loan portfolio over total assets  
Urban market 1= MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market 0= otherwise 
Group lending 1 = if MFI adopts group lending method, 0 = otherwise 
Individual lending 1 = if individual lending method, 0 = otherwise 
GDP per person  Gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing power 
parity (constant 2011 international $) 
GDP growth Annual gross domestic product percentage growth rate 
Inflation  Annual consumer price index 
Regulation Regulation is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if the 





















Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. 
Operational self-sustainability (OSS) 1.104 0.315 0.076 1.977 1574 
Financial self-sustainability (FSS) 0.952 0.298 0.064 3.469 1562 
Returns on assets (ROA) 0.026 0.074 -0.298 0.293 3030 
Returns on equity (ROE) 0.082 0.208 -0.887 0.862 2908 
Diversification index (DIV) 0.130 0.135 -0.473 0.500 3167 
Non-interest revenue (share-non) 0.081 0.105 -0.296 0.599 3122 
Total assets in logarithm (MFI size) 15.297 1.642 4.871 20.923 3248 
Age of MFI in years (MFI experience) 10.892 7.584 0.000 52.000 3268 
Portfolio at risk over 30 days (Par30) 0.054 0.067 -0.271 0.398 2949 
Equity to assets ratio (Equity) 0.369 0.273 -1.571 1.000 3216 
Loan portfolio to assets ratio (Loan) 0.745 0.170 0.008 0.999 3167 
Urban market 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 2641 
Group lending (Group) 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000 2855 
Individual lending (Individual) 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 2855 
GDP growth (%) 5.121 3.260 -14.150 14.722 3253 
GDP per person (log) 8.446 0.892 6.307 10.544 3288 
Inflation  0.064 0.051 -0.185 0.287 2298 
Regulation  0.363 0.481 0.000 1.000 2913 















Table 3: Pairwise correlation matrix and VIF scores 
















 VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. DIV      1.20 1.0000             
2. Share-non 1.16 0.9634* 1.0000            
3. MFI size 1.41 0.0077 0.0043 1.0000           
4. MFI experience 1.30 0.0923* 0.0740* 0.3591* 1.0000          
5. Par30 1.22 0.2139* 0.2022* -0.0792* 0.1458* 1.0000         
6. Equity/asset 1.14 -0.1270* -0.1197* -0.1123* -0.0701* -0.1108* 1.0000        
7. Loan/asset 1.16 -0.3616* -0.3411* 0.1208* 0.0428 -0.1895* 0.0176 1.0000       
8. Urban 1.11 -0.0223 -0.0284 -0.0440 -0.0796* 0.0496 0.0601 0.0233 1.0000      
9. Group 1.83 -0.0555 -0.0497 -0.2154* -0.1525* -0.0882* 0.0240 -0.0869* -0.0347 1.0000     
10. Individual 2.02 0.1184* 0.1092* 0.2417* 0.1426* 0.1488* -0.0705 0.0558 0.1479* -0.6784* 1.0000    
11. GDP  growth 1.08 -0.1051* -0.0993* -0.1197* -0.0628 -0.1124* 0.0637 0.0818* -0.0720 0.1044* -0.0843* 1.0000   
12. GDP per person 1.20 -0.1156* -0.1013* 0.1924* 0.0691* -0.0645 0.0315 0.2068*  0.0956* -0.2183* 0.2216* -0.2042* 1.0000  
13. Inflation 1.05 0.0577 0.0521 -0.0608 -0.0320 -0.0490 -0.0188 -0.0345 0.0202 0.0556 -0.0247 0.1229* -0.1068* 1.0000 




    Table 4: Effects of revenue diversification on sustainability of microfinance institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Operational self-sustainability Financial self-sustainability 
DIV 0.1151* 0.0298 0.0965 0.1116 0.0666 -0.0496 0.0181 0.0296 
 (0.0653) (0.0730) (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0659) (0.0653) (0.0686) (0.0684) 
MFI size  0.1314*** 0.1040*** 0.1099***  0.1408*** 0.1330*** 0.1389*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0201)  (0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0188) 
MFI experience  -0.0129** -0.0158** -0.0143**  -0.0050 -0.0089 -0.0072 
  (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0066)  (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.9335*** -0.9313*** -0.8534***  -0.7150*** -0.9082*** -0.8061*** 
  (0.1723) (0.1860) (0.1891)  (0.1564) (0.1684) (0.1705) 
Equity/assets  0.1742*** 0.2271*** 0.2229***  0.0793 0.1098** 0.1072** 
  (0.0499) (0.0564) (0.0563)  (0.0483) (0.0535) (0.0532) 
Loan/assets  0.3024*** 0.2959*** 0.2749***  0.2717*** 0.2183*** 0.2045*** 
  (0.0746) (0.0755) (0.0757)  (0.0631) (0.0636) (0.0634) 
Urban market  0.1222*** 0.0822 0.0740  0.2582*** 0.2205*** 0.2110*** 
  (0.0470) (0.0531) (0.0531)  (0.0410) (0.0478) (0.0477) 
Group lending  0.2029* 0.1666 0.1521  -0.1785* -0.2530** -0.2647** 
  (0.1101) (0.1172) (0.1171)  (0.1050) (0.1088) (0.1083) 
Individual lending  -0.0284 -0.0947 -0.0766  -0.0816 -0.1375* -0.1146 
  (0.0726) (0.0818) (0.0819)  (0.0728) (0.0766) (0.0766) 
GDP growth   0.0041 0.0038   0.0053** 0.0051** 
   (0.0026) (0.0026)   (0.0024) (0.0024) 
GDP per person   0.3392*** 0.3686***   0.1401 0.1734 
   (0.1238) (0.1240)   (0.1140) (0.1139) 
Inflation    -0.1805 -0.1678   -0.7478*** -0.7559*** 
   (0.1749) (0.1745)   (0.1623) (0.1616) 
Regulation     -0.1123***    -0.1197*** 
    (0.0424)    (0.0391) 
Constant 1.0888*** -1.0638*** -3.4829*** -3.7968*** 0.9438*** -1.3057*** -2.2214** -2.5759*** 
 (0.0103) (0.2287) (0.9736) (0.9780) (0.0104) (0.2237) (0.8967) (0.8996) 
Observations 1,526 1,112 908 903 1,526 1,124 936 931 
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Number of MFIs 386 343 272 270 384 347 284 282 
R-squared 0.003 0.180 0.200 0.209 0.001 0.256 0.277 0.288 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where OSS and FSS are  regressed on DIV with(out) controls.  OSS is operational self-sustainability (models 
1 to 4), FSS is financial self-sustainability (models 4 to 8) and DIV is an indicator for revenue diversification. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total assets, MFI 
experience is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days, Equity/Assets is the 
ratio of equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market, 0 = otherwise. 
Group lending = 1 if MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per 
person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the annual 
consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  




























Table 5: Effects of revenue diversification on profitability of microfinance institutions 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Variables Returns on assets Returns on equity 
DIV -0.0082 0.0147 0.0313* 0.0287* 0.0362 0.0810** 0.0761* 0.0708 
 (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0359) (0.0407) (0.0459) (0.0464) 
MFI size  0.0137*** 0.0152*** 0.0162***  0.0532*** 0.0532*** 0.0546*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0039)  (0.0088) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
MFI experience  -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0010  -0.0064** -0.0067* -0.0068* 
  (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.1827*** -0.2196*** -0.2222***  -0.7218*** -0.9139*** -0.9239*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0352) (0.0355)  (0.0825) (0.0977) (0.0987) 
Equity/assets  0.0546*** 0.0483*** 0.0483***  0.0021 0.0231 0.0270 
  (0.0093) (0.0106) (0.0108)  (0.0274) (0.0306) (0.0311) 
Loan/assets  0.0867*** 0.0762*** 0.0757***  0.1764*** 0.1585*** 0.1594*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0151)  (0.0383) (0.0423) (0.0429) 
Urban market  0.0092 0.0138* 0.0145*  0.0431** 0.0337 0.0339 
  (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0084)  (0.0198) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
Group lending  0.0140 -0.0048 -0.0014  0.0646 0.0469 0.0475 
  (0.0174) (0.0204) (0.0206)  (0.0493) (0.0568) (0.0573) 
Individual lending  0.0027 -0.0172 -0.0129  0.0237 0.0028 0.0031 
  (0.0159) (0.0188) (0.0191)  (0.0458) (0.0522) (0.0529) 
GDP growth   0.0014*** 0.0013**   0.0018 0.0018 
   (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP per person   0.0029 0.0085   0.0474 0.0433 
   (0.0249) (0.0253)   (0.0691) (0.0704) 
Inflation    -0.0011 -0.0063   -0.1054 -0.1127 
   (0.0339) (0.0343)   (0.0951) (0.0962) 
Regulation     -0.0149*    0.0007 
    (0.0088)    (0.0246) 
Constant 0.0278*** -0.2569*** -0.2869 -0.3490* 0.0796*** -0.8107*** -1.1806** -1.1698** 
 (0.0019) (0.0439) (0.1977) (0.2020) (0.0053) (0.1279) (0.5503) (0.5619) 
Observations 2,956 2,163 1,674 1,648 2,841 2,088 1,634 1,609 
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Number of case 591 515 421 417 549 484 410 405 
R-squared 0.000 0.083 0.102 0.107 0.000 0.103 0.134 0.137 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where ROA and ROE are regressed on DIV with(out) controls.  ROA is returns on assets (models 9 to 12), 
ROE is returns on equity (models 13 to 16) and DIV is an indicator for revenue diversification. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is 
number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days, Equity/Assets is the ratio of equity 
to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market, 0 = otherwise. Group lending 
= 1 if MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per person is the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the annual consumer price 
index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  



























Table 6: Effects of revenue diversification on sustainability of microfinance institutions 
 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Variables Operational self-sustainability Financial self-sustainability 
Share-non 0.1472* 0.0757 0.1653* 0.1783* 0.1069 -0.0395 0.0301 0.0385 
 (0.0822) (0.0923) (0.0979) (0.0978) (0.0828) (0.0838) (0.0894) (0.0891) 
MFI size  0.1316*** 0.1026*** 0.1084***  0.1405*** 0.1332*** 0.1392*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0202)  (0.0157) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
MFI experience  -0.0135** -0.0165** -0.0150**  -0.0046 -0.0086 -0.0067 
  (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0066)  (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.9563*** -0.9650*** -0.8883***  -0.7324*** -0.9403*** -0.8347*** 
  (0.1736) (0.1873) (0.1908)  (0.1569) (0.1692) (0.1714) 
Equity/assets  0.1710*** 0.2230*** 0.2196***  0.0830* 0.1114** 0.1100** 
  (0.0500) (0.0565) (0.0564)  (0.0484) (0.0535) (0.0532) 
Loan/assets  0.3064*** 0.3015*** 0.2803***  0.2565*** 0.1981*** 0.1812*** 
  (0.0746) (0.0755) (0.0758)  (0.0640) (0.0648) (0.0647) 
Urban market  0.1257*** 0.0877 0.0794  0.2613*** 0.2284*** 0.2192*** 
  (0.0471) (0.0533) (0.0533)  (0.0410) (0.0478) (0.0477) 
Group lending  0.1987* 0.1645 0.1507  -0.1812* -0.2575** -0.2696** 
  (0.1105) (0.1173) (0.1172)  (0.1049) (0.1087) (0.1081) 
Individual lending  -0.0330 -0.0971 -0.0797  -0.0841 -0.1400* -0.1170 
  (0.0732) (0.0820) (0.0820)  (0.0729) (0.0766) (0.0766) 
GDP growth   0.0043* 0.0039   0.0059** 0.0056** 
   (0.0026) (0.0026)   (0.0024) (0.0024) 
GDP per person   0.3497*** 0.3776***   0.1475 0.1809 
   (0.1240) (0.1242)   (0.1139) (0.1138) 
Inflation    -0.1844 -0.1713   -0.6963*** -0.6975*** 
   (0.1749) (0.1747)   (0.1653) (0.1645) 
Regulation     -0.1077**    -0.1204*** 
    (0.0425)    (0.0391) 
Constant 1.0924*** -1.0596*** -3.5422*** -3.8428*** 0.9436*** -1.2970*** -2.2795** -2.6370*** 
 (0.0088) (0.2293) (0.9743) (0.9791) (0.0089) (0.2239) (0.8960) (0.8988) 
Observations 1,513 1,108 905 900 1,515 1,119 932 927 
Number of case 385 343 273 271 383 346 284 282 
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R-squared 0.003 0.181 0.202 0.211 0.001 0.258 0.280 0.291 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where OSS and FSS are regressed on Share-non with(out) controls.  OSS is operational self-sustainability 
(models 17 to 20), FSS is financial self-sustainability (models 21 to 24) and Share-non is a ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue. MFI size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 
30 days, Equity/Assets is the ratio of equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as 
main market, 0 = otherwise. Group lending = 1 if the MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are 
offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic 
Product. Inflation is the annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking 
authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  




























Table 7: Effects of revenue diversification on profitability of microfinance institutions 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Variables Returns on assets Returns on equity 
Share-non -0.0061 0.0276 0.0452** 0.0424** 0.0240 0.1125** 0.1244** 0.1195** 
 (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0473) (0.0537) (0.0602) (0.0607) 
MFI size  0.0148*** 0.0155*** 0.0165***  0.0527*** 0.0551*** 0.0566*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0039)  (0.0088) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
MFI experience  -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013  -0.0066** -0.0074** -0.0074** 
  (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.1677*** -0.2078*** -0.2104***  -0.6912*** -0.9014*** -0.9118*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0348) (0.0351)  (0.0837) (0.0975) (0.0985) 
Equity/assets  0.0540*** 0.0444*** 0.0445***  -0.0020 0.0167 0.0207 
  (0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0106)  (0.0274) (0.0305) (0.0309) 
Loan/assets  0.0999*** 0.0862*** 0.0861***  0.1971*** 0.1770*** 0.1787*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0152)  (0.0390) (0.0430) (0.0436) 
Urban market  0.0116* 0.0172** 0.0179**  0.0482** 0.0403* 0.0405* 
  (0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0083)  (0.0197) (0.0239) (0.0240) 
Group lending  0.0135 -0.0061 -0.0026  0.0610 0.0441 0.0447 
  (0.0172) (0.0201) (0.0203)  (0.0492) (0.0565) (0.0570) 
Individual lending  0.0020 -0.0181 -0.0139  0.0210 -0.0009 -0.0007 
  (0.0158) (0.0185) (0.0188)  (0.0458) (0.0519) (0.0526) 
GDP growth   0.0014*** 0.0012**   0.0017 0.0016 
   (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP per person   0.0018 0.0071   0.0413 0.0368 
   (0.0245) (0.0250)   (0.0688) (0.0701) 
Inflation    -0.0201 -0.0254   -0.1329 -0.1409 
   (0.0337) (0.0341)   (0.0954) (0.0965) 
Regulation     -0.0146*    0.0005 
    (0.0087)    (0.0245) 
Constant 0.0269*** -0.2814*** -0.2845 -0.3441* 0.0821*** -0.8154*** -1.1606** -1.1480** 
 (0.0017) (0.0437) (0.1946) (0.1987) (0.0046) (0.1282) (0.5470) (0.5584) 
Observations 2,921 2,141 1,664 1,638 2,808 2,066 1,624 1,599 
Number of MFIs 590 513 420 416 548 482 409 404 
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R-squared 0.000 0.089 0.104 0.110 0.000 0.101 0.137 0.140 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where ROA and ROE are regressed on Share-non with(out) controls.  ROA is returns on assets (models 25 to 
28), ROE is returns on equity (models 29 to 32) and Share-non is a ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total assets, 
MFI experience is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days, Equity/Assets is 
the ratio of equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market, 0 = 
otherwise. Group lending = 1 if MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are offered, 0= otherwise.  
GDP per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the 
annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  




























Table A1: Distribution of number of microfinance institutions by country 
# Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs 
1 Albania 3 27 Kyrgyz Republic 9 53 Nepal 5 79 Comoros 1 
2 Argentina 2 28 Madagascar 3 54 Vietnam 4 80 Italy 3 
3 Armenia 6 29 Mali 11 55 Azerbaijan 9 81 Samoa 1 
4 Benin 8 30 Mexico 31 56 Mongolia 4 82 Sierra Leone 1 
5 Bolivia 17 31 Moldova 2 57 Nigeria 6 83 South Sudan 1 
6 Bosnia & Herzegovina 12 32 Morocco 8 58 Mozambique 1 84 United Kingdom 1 
7 Brazil 14 33 Nicaragua 14 59 Tajikistan 11 85 Yemen 1 
8 Bulgaria 3 34 Pakistan 2 60 Croatia 1 86 Angola 1 
9 Burkina Faso 9 35 Paraguay 2 61 Chad 3 87 Macedonia 1 
10 Cambodia 14 36 Peru 40 62 Rwanda 12  Total 607 
11 Chile 2 37 Philippines 22 63 Zambia 3    
12 Colombia 14 38 Romania 7 64 China 5    
13 Dominican Republic 7 39 Russia 17 65 Serbia 2    
14 Ecuador 20 40 Senegal 12 66 Ghana 5    
15 Egypt 6 41 South Africa 4 67 Malawi 2    
16 El Salvador 7 42 Sri Lanka 2 68 Gambia 1    
17 Ethiopia 10 43 Tanzania 8 69 Kosovo 5    
18 Georgia 8 44 Togo 5 70 Congo 1    
19 Guatemala 8 45 Trinidad and Tobago 1 71 Burundi 6    
20 Haiti 3 46 Tunisia 1 72 Niger 8    
21 Honduras 13 47 Uganda 25 73 Dem. Rep. Congo 1    
22 India 32 48 Montenegro 2 74 Afghanistan 2    
23 Indonesia 4 49 Cameroon 5 75 Costa Rica 3    
24 Jordan 3 50 Guinea 3 76 Lebanon 2    
25 Kazakhstan 8 51 Timor 1 77 Turkey 1    




Table A2: Effects of revenue diversification on financial performance of microfinance institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable OSS FSS ROA ROE OSS FSS ROA ROE 
Share-non 0.1783* 0.0385 0.0424** 0.1195**     
 (0.0978) (0.0891) (0.0212) (0.0607)     
DIV     0.1116 0.0296 0.0287* 0.0708 
     (0.0763) (0.0684) (0.0163) (0.0464) 
MFI size 0.1084*** 0.1392*** 0.0165*** 0.0566*** 0.1099*** 0.1389*** 0.0162*** 0.0546*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0039) (0.0110) (0.0201) (0.0188) (0.0039) (0.0109) 
MFI experience -0.0150** -0.0067 -0.0013 -0.0074** -0.0143** -0.0072 -0.0010 -0.0068* 
 (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0035) 
Portfolio at risk -0.8883*** -0.8347*** -0.2104*** -0.9118*** -0.8534*** -0.8061*** -0.2222*** -0.9239*** 
 (0.1908) (0.1714) (0.0351) (0.0985) (0.1891) (0.1705) (0.0355) (0.0987) 
Equity/assets 0.2196*** 0.1100** 0.0445*** 0.0207 0.2229*** 0.1072** 0.0483*** 0.0270 
 (0.0564) (0.0532) (0.0106) (0.0309) (0.0563) (0.0532) (0.0108) (0.0311) 
Loan/assets 0.2803*** 0.1812*** 0.0861*** 0.1787*** 0.2749*** 0.2045*** 0.0757*** 0.1594*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0647) (0.0152) (0.0436) (0.0757) (0.0634) (0.0151) (0.0429) 
Urban market 0.0794 0.2192*** 0.0179** 0.0405* 0.0740 0.2110*** 0.0145* 0.0339 
 (0.0533) (0.0477) (0.0083) (0.0240) (0.0531) (0.0477) (0.0084) (0.0241) 
Group lending 0.1507 -0.2696** -0.0026 0.0447 0.1521 -0.2647** -0.0014 0.0475 
 (0.1172) (0.1081) (0.0203) (0.0570) (0.1171) (0.1083) (0.0206) (0.0573) 
Individual lending -0.0797 -0.1170 -0.0139 -0.0007 -0.0766 -0.1146 -0.0129 0.0031 
 (0.0820) (0.0766) (0.0188) (0.0526) (0.0819) (0.0766) (0.0191) (0.0529) 
GDP growth 0.0039 0.0056** 0.0012** 0.0016 0.0038 0.0051** 0.0013** 0.0018 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
GDP per person 0.3776*** 0.1809 0.0071 0.0368 0.3686*** 0.1734 0.0085 0.0433 
 (0.1242) (0.1138) (0.0250) (0.0701) (0.1240) (0.1139) (0.0253) (0.0704) 
Inflation  -0.1713 -0.6975*** -0.0254 -0.1409 -0.1678 -0.7559*** -0.0063 -0.1127 
 (0.1747) (0.1645) (0.0341) (0.0965) (0.1745) (0.1616) (0.0343) (0.0962) 
Regulation  -0.1077** -0.1204*** -0.0146* 0.0005 -0.1123*** -0.1197*** -0.0149* 0.0007 
 (0.0425) (0.0391) (0.0087) (0.0245) (0.0424) (0.0391) (0.0088) (0.0246) 
Constant -3.8428*** -2.6370*** -0.3441* -1.1480** -3.7968*** -2.5759*** -0.3490* -1.1698** 
 (0.9791) (0.8988) (0.1987) (0.5584) (0.9780) (0.8996) (0.2020) (0.5619) 
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Observations 900 927 1,638 1,599 903 931 1,648 1,609 
Number of MFIs 271 282 416 404 270 282 417 405 
R-squared 0.211 0.291 0.110 0.140 0.209 0.288 0.107 0.137 
Breusch test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.3217 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.4303 0.0059 
Notes: This table lists the results of fixed effects regression.  OSS is operational self-sustainability, FSS is financial self-sustainability, ROA is returns on assets, 
ROE is returns on equity, DIV is an indicator for revenue diversification, and Share-non is a ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue. MFI size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 
30 days, Equity/Assets is the ratio of equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as 
main market, 0 = otherwise. Group lending = 1 if MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are 
offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic 
Product. Inflation is the annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking 
authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
